rifəlraftər

I can’t decide if these various “Series of Paradox” are a.) terribly translated b.) verbose expositions of a simple idea, or c.) complete, and utter philosophical hogwash. Perhaps it’s a combination of the three. Who is this guy?

Accepting that both the 11th and 12th Series adequately explore the intricacies of paradoxes and the connection they hold with human pattern of thought, I maintain that what was said in 20 pages could have been said in 2. At first, I was hesitant to accept the piece as authentic, taking it as an example of nonsense, in itself and of itself, shrouded in a cloud of academic verbiage and philosophical give-and-take—in this instance, the giving and the taking being enacted by the same person, a Gilles Deleuze. Half way through, I was on the verge of tossing the excerpt aside, flinging my pencil—studiously employed in the act of annotation seconds before—against the wall, and victoriously proclaiming that modern philosophy is, as I expected, a complete waste of time! However, as curiosity got the best of me, I read on, hoping that at its denouement, some shadow of meaning would come forth. As before, I was invariably disappointed.

Deleuze’s exegesis on paradox is breathtaking in the absolute worst sense of the word. The first few pages—I don’t care to count—are dedicated to exposing the concept of names, and defining names by abstraction. If I assumed correctly, the author states that a sensical name relies on other names to denote its meaning. This act usually involves the process of abstraction by which a name—or word—is defined by other names or words, while the root-word remains a single strand in an intricate web of associations and linguistic interplay. He goes on to apply this process to nonsensical words, and, in so doing, exposes that—of course—it is not effective under the same application. Nonsense words, he goes on to explain, contain their own web of logic. Simply through their expression and existence, they somehow exhibit their meaning and purpose. He professes, perhaps in the singular instance of impassioned argument within his essay, that the sense of nonsense is not that it “hasn’t any,” but rather that it is an expression of a universe—of sense in itself.  The nonsense word defines and states its own sense.

He goes on. After founding that “sense is always an effect”—by which I assume he means that sense is only created if and when there is an adequate infrastructure surrounding its existence—Deleuze explores the troubling quandary of the paradox.  He states what follows:

par⋅a⋅dox
/ˈpærəˌdɒks/[par-uh-doks]–noun
1.     a statement or proposition that seems self-contradictory or absurd but in reality         expresses a possible truth.
2.     a self-contradictory and false proposition.
3.     any person, thing, or situation exhibiting an apparently contradictory nature.
4.     an opinion or statement contrary to commonly accepted
Emphasis on 1 and 3.

What I mean to unmask is that Deleuze’s extrapolation on the nature of the paradox is simply a slipshod attempt at expanding the well known, and easily understood definition of said device. Of course, as a philosopher, he is pressured by the expectations found within the critics of his chosen métier to apply a general and standardized subject—the paradox—to the harrowing and contradictory thing that is human existence. But honestly, one can easily take this too far. In connection with Alice, he uses the common instance of “doubles” in Carroll’s seminal work, to explain the concept of opposite tensions found in paradox. That is, two elements are presented as fact, each with a logical foundation in certainty. The paradox thus arises in the separation of and selection between the two disparate elements. What he concludes is that the paradox relies on this bilateral separation and tension. The first half relies on the other for coherence, as does the second; a statement is made in contradiction.  He then goes on, ad naseum, to point out additional instances of contradictory paradox in Carrol’s Alice. In this regard, I suppose this essay is not entirely useless.

On Second encounter and thought, Deleuze’s arguments are wonderfully informative and worthy of fascination.
I have recently taken on his additional “series” as a source for a paper I hope to complete by the end of the month.

If the visitor or potential contributor is to understand at all the purpose of this site, (s)he must become acquainted with Ezra Pound’s ABC of Reading. The aesthetic theory—literary, musical, visual—of Pound is unmatched. Therein, the book exposes previous attempts by others at creating a concise theory of artistic-criticism as futile and insufficient. The read is short, humorously self disparaging of Pound as literary critic, and unambiguous; one will not be easily lost between its covers.

The book’s importance lies in the inception of this site; that is, rifəlraftər’s emergence and concept are directly related to the opening statement of Pound’s work.

This site, as Pound presents his book is “for those who might like to learn. [It] is not addressed to those who have arrived at full knowledge of the subject without knowing the facts.”

As Pound states, the key aspects of intellectual growth are the admittance of one’s own ignorance, along with a voluntary willingness and a curiosity towards knowledge.

I readily admit my ignorance to you and look forward to impassioned discussion and discovery in the near future.

The text can be found on Google books via the link to the right of this page. One need not dissect it to understand Pound’s general thesis; instead, I would suggest skimming through, reading the chapters that strike you as more humorous or most worthwhile. However, many of the literary exercises explained by Pound are indispensable to one who might take on the challenge of true literary understanding and appreciation.